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In quantum version of the Battle of Sexes game recently suggested
by Marinatto and Weber [Phys. Lett. A 272, 291 (2000)] the worst-
case payoffs occur when ‘tactics’ are mismatched for a particular initial
quantum state or ‘initial strategy’ in the scheme. We show that when a
more general initial quantum state is used in this scheme the worst-case
payoffs do not occur even for mismatched tactics.
1 Introduction
Battle of sexes is an interesting game from a class called the static games of
complete information. In the usual exposition of this game two players Alice
and Bob are trying to decide where to pass Saturday evening. Alice wants to
attend Opera while Bob will be happy to watch TV and both would be happier
to remain together. Both players want to maximize their individual payos.




O (; ) (γ; γ)
T (γ; γ) (; )
where O and T represent Opera and TV respectively. ,,γ are the payos
for players on dierent choices of strategies and  >  > γ. There are two Nash
equilibria (O;O) and (T; T ) existing in classical form of the game. Because no
exchange of information between the players takes place they face a dilemma
between choosing a stable solution e.g. if one player chooses to play O and the
other chooses to play T , then the payo to both is γ and this is the worst case
payos situation.
Marinatto and Weber [1] proposed a scheme to quantize the game to remove
the dilemma. They gave Hilbert structure to the strategic space of the players
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and showed that if the players are allowed to play quantum strategies involving
unitary operators and initial entangled states the game has the unique solution.
They used an initial state of the form j i = 1p2(jOOi + jTT i) and allowed
players to play their tactics by a probabilistic choice between applying the iden-
tity operator I and the flip operator C. The symbols p and qrepresent the
probabilities that operator I is used by Alice and Bob respectively. The maxi-
mum payo is obtained if (p = q = 1) i.e. both the players choose to apply I
with certainty or for (p = q = 0) i.e. both the players choose to apply the flip
operator C with certainty. In each case the expected payo is + 2 to each
player.
However in an interesting comment Benjamin [2] pointed out \ it seems us
that dilemma remains for the players, even given that they have performed the
above reasoning - should they opt for (p = q = 0) or for (p = q = 1)?
Without knowing the choice of the other player, the players face the dilemma
to choose between them". Benjamin added \ if the tactics are mismatched i.e.
if (p = 0; q = 1) or (p = 1; q = 0) are adopted then worst case payos
situation will occur. This is almost the same problem faced by players in the
traditional game".
In this paper we show that the worst case payos situation in Marinatto
and Weber scheme [1].appears due to the restricted initial quantum state and
it can be removed if a more general initial quantum state of the form j ini =
a jOOi + b jOT i + c jTOi + d jTT i is used instead. In such a case the tactics
(p = 0; q = 1) and (p = 1; q = 0) do not create worst case payos situation.
2 Quantum Battle of sexes
Let the players Alice and Bob have the following entangled state on their dis-
posal
j ini = a jOOi + b jOT i+ c jTOi+ d jTT i
where jaj2 + jbj2 + jcj2 + jdj2 = 1
where rst position in ket-bra ji is reserved for Alice and the second for Bob.
The corresponding density matrix is
in = jaj2 jOOi hOOj + ab jOOi hOT j+ ac jOOi hTOj+ ad jOOi hTT j
+ba jOT i hOOj + jbj2 jOT i hOT j+ bc jOT i hTOj+ bd jOT i hTT j
+ca jTOi hOOj + cb jTOi hOT j+ jcj2 jTOi hTOj+ cd jTOi hTT j
+da jTT i hOOj + db jTT i hOT j+ dc jTT i hTOj+ jdj2 jTT i hTT j
Let C be a unitary and Hermitian operator such that [1]
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C jOi = jT i ; C jT i = jOi ; C = Cy = C−1 (1)
If the operator I and the operator C are used by Alice with probabilities p
and 1− p respectively and corresponding probabilities for Bob are q and 1− q
respectively then the nal density matrix takes the form [1]
f = pqIA ⊗ IBinIyA ⊗ IyB + p(1− q)IA ⊗ CBinIyA ⊗ CyB
+q(1− p)CA ⊗ IBinCyA ⊗ IyB + (1 − p)(1− q)CA ⊗ CBinCyA ⊗ CyB
The payo operators for Alice and Bob are [1]
PA =  jOOi hOOj + γ(jOT i hOT j+ jTOi hTOj) +  jTT i hTT j (2)
PB =  jOOi hOOj + γ(jOT i hOT j+ jTOi hTOj) +  jTT i hTT j (3)
The payo functions are obtained as the mean values of these operators i.e.
$A(p; q) = Tr(PAf ) $B(p; q) = Tr(PBf ) (4)
Using eqs. (1,2,2,3,4) we get the payo functions for both the players
$A(p; q) = p[q(+  − 2γ)(jaj2 − jbj2 − jcj2 + jdj2)
+(γ − ) jaj2 + (− γ) jbj2 + ( − γ) jcj2 + (γ − ) jdj2]
+q[(γ − ) jaj2 + ( − γ) jbj2 + (− γ) jcj2
+(γ − ) jdj2] +  jdj2 + γ jcj2 + γ jbj2 +  jaj2 (5)
$B(p; q) = q[p(+  − 2γ)(jaj2 − jbj2 − jcj2 + jdj2)
+(γ − ) jaj2 + (− γ) jbj2 + ( − γ) jcj2 + (γ − ) jdj2]
+p[(γ − ) jaj2 + ( − γ) jbj2 + (− γ) jcj2
+(γ − ) jdj2] +  jdj2 + γ jcj2 + γ jbj2 +  jaj2 (6)
Nash equilibria are found by solving the following two inequalities.
$A(p; q)− $A(p; q)  0 )
(p − p)[q(+  − 2γ)(jaj2 − jbj2 − jcj2 + jdj2)+
(γ − ) jaj2 + (− γ) jbj2 + ( − γ) jcj2 + (γ − ) jdj2]  0
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$B(p; q)− $B(p; q)  0 )
(q − q)[p(+  − 2γ)(jaj2 − jbj2 − jcj2 + jdj2)+
(γ − ) jaj2 + (− γ) jbj2 + ( − γ) jcj2 + (γ − ) jdj2]  0
These inequalities are satised if both factors in each inequality have same signs.
There arise the following possibilities for the pure strategies i.e. p and q can
assume values of 0 and/or 1.
2.0.1 Case (a)
Matched strategies
(1): (p = q = 0)
From inequalities (2,2) we need
(γ − ) jaj2 + (− γ) jbj2 + ( − γ) jcj2 + (γ − ) jdj2 < 0
(γ − ) jaj2 + (− γ) jbj2 + ( − γ) jcj2 + (γ − ) jdj2] < 0 (7)
The inequalities (7) are satised, for example, at
jaj2 = jdj2 = jbj2 = 516; jcj2 = 116 (8)
Therefore from eqs. (5,6)
$A(0; 0) =  jdj2 +  jaj2 + γ(jcj2 + jbj2) = 5+ 5 + 6γ16
$B(0; 0) =  jdj2 +  jaj2 + γ(jcj2 + jbj2) = 5+ 5 + 6γ16 (9)
(2): (p = q = 1)
In this case from inequalities (2,2) we get
(− γ) jaj2 + (γ − ) jbj2 + (γ − ) jcj2 + ( − γ) jdj2 > 0
( − γ) jaj2 + (γ − ) jbj2 + (γ − ) jcj2 + (− γ) jdj2 > 0 (10)
The inequalities (10) are also satised for the same values of parameters of (8).
Therefore from eqs. (5,6)
$A(1; 1) =  jaj2 +  jdj2 + γ(jcj2 + jbj2) = 5+ 5 + 6γ16
$B(1; 1) =  jaj2 +  jdj2 + γ(jcj2 + jbj2) = 5+ 5 + 6γ16 (11)
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The payo 5+ 5 + 6γ16 = γ+5(− γ) + 5( − γ)16 appearing in eqs. (9,11)
is clearly greater than γ:
Mismatched strategies:
For an initial state for which the requirements of (8) hold the mismatched
strategies i.e. (p = 0; q = 1) or (p = 1; q = 0) do not remain NE and players
get the following payos (5,6)
$A(0; 1) = + 5 + 10γ16; $B(0; 1) = 5+  + 10γ16 (12)
$A(1; 0) = 5+  + 10γ16; $B(1; 0) = + 5 + 10γ16 (13)
But now both + 5 + 10γ16 = γ+(− γ) + 5( − γ)16 and 5+  + 10γ16 =
γ + 5(− γ) + ( − γ)16 are again greater than γ, the worst-case payo in the
classical game. Therefore even if the mismatched strategies occur in this quan-
tum game the players are not faced with worst-case payos of the classical game.
2.0.2 Case (b)
Mismatched strategies
(1): (p = 0; q = 1)
In this case eqs. (2,2) demand
(− γ) jaj2 + (γ − ) jbj2 + (γ − ) jcj2 + ( − γ) jdj2 < 0
(γ − ) jaj2 + ( − γ) jbj2 + ( − γ) jcj2 + (γ − ) jdj2 > 0 (14)
These inequalities hold, for example, at
jaj2 = 116; jbj2 = jdj2 = jcj2 = 516 (15)
Therefore eqs. (5,6) give
$A(0; 1) =  jcj2 +  jbj2 + γ(jaj2 + jdj2) = 5+ 5 + 6γ16
$B(0; 1) =  jbj2 +  jcj2 + γ(jaj2 + jdj2) = 5+ 5 + 6γ16 (16)
(2) (p = 1; q = 0)
Here the eqs. (2,2) require
(γ − ) jaj2 + ( − γ) jbj2 + ( − γ) jcj2 + (γ − ) jdj2 > 0
( − γ) jaj2 + (γ − ) jbj2 + (γ − ) jcj2 + (− γ) jdj2 < 0 (17)
These iequalities are also satised at the values (15). Thus from eqs. (5,6)
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$A(1; 0) =  jbj2 +  jcj2 + γ(jaj2 + jdj2) = 5+ 5 + 6γ16
$B(1; 0) =  jcj2 +  jbj2 + γ(jaj2 + jdj2) = 5+ 5 + 6γ16 (18)
The payo 5+ 5 + 6γ16 = γ + 5(− γ) + 5( − γ)16 once again is greater
than γ, the classical worst-case payo.
Matched strategies:
For the initial state with the requirements of (15) hold true the matched
strategies i.e. (p = 0; q = 0) and (p = 1; q = 1) do not remain NE and
players get the following payos
$A(0; 0) = 5+  + 10γ16; $B(0; 0) = + 5 + 10γ16
$A(1; 1) = + 5 + 10γ16; $B(1; 1) = 5+  + 10γ16 (19)
But again these payos are greater than γ, the worst-case payo of the classical
game. Therefore if the matched strategies occur in this quantum game when
the mismatched strategies form a NE the players are not faced with worst-case
payos of the classical game.
3 Conclusion
With the mismatched pure strategies (p = 0; q = 1) and (p = 1; q = 0)
played in the Battle of Sexes, quantized through Marinatto and Weber’s scheme,
the worst-case payos situation appears as faced in the classical form of this
game. We have shown that it is not a shortcoming in the quantization scheme
but in fact it occurs because of using a restricted initial quantum state. We used
a general quantum state of the form j ini = a jOOi+ b jOT i+ c jTOi+ d jTT i
and showed that in the corresponding quantum game the mismatched strategies
did not produce the worst case payos situation.
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